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Issues in the Administration of
Tariff-Rate Import Quotas in The
Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO:
An Introduction
Harry de Gorter and Ian M. Sheldon
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA) put in place a set of rules that may, in the
future, have significant effects on the conditions
for market access for agricultural products, Bound
tariffs replaced non-tariff barriers in most cases,
and rules facing exporters are now more transpar-
ent. In addition, minimum access commitments
were made through the use of import quotas, with
a lower tariff for imports within the quota. Al-
though agriculture is now integrated into the mul-
tilateral trading system, most commentators agree
that the URAA did little actually to liberalize ag-
ricultural trade. Bound out-of-quota tariffs remain
very high while quotas have resulted in the insti-
tutionalization of rents for specific countries and
firms or state trading enterprises, thereby poten-
tially increasing resistance by these stakeholders to
any trade liberalization initiatives.
Potential, however, for trade liberalization
through reduction in tariffs or increases in quotas
could be realized at the pending agricultural trade
negotiations in the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Developing countries in particular have
much at stake here, as potentially large exporters
who lose significantly from agricultural trade re-
strictions. The purpose of this special section of the
Review is to assess the problems and issues related
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to administering the large number of tariff rate
quotas (TRQs). No specific provisions were ap-
proved in the URAA regarding administration of
the quotas, although relevant GATT rules were to
apply. WTO member countries use a host of dif-
ferent methods for administering TRQs, ranging
from applied tariffs and auctioning to licenses on
demand. A summary of the various methods
adopted by different countries is given in table 1.
In addition, other conditions placed on TRQ ad-
ministration are listed. Some of which also have
the potential to generate inefficiencies and inequi-
ties.
Quota administration can have a direct influence
on both trade flows and the distribution of rents
originating under the quotas, and is, therefore, a
highly political issue. In the debate about imple-
mentation of the URAA, much dissatisfaction has
been voiced regarding TRQ administration in
many specific cases, and in some cases formal dis-
putes have been brought before the WTO. There is
an urgent need to provide more information on
how TRQs are currently administered, what the
economic implications are, how trade flows have
developed under TRQs, what better rules for TRQ
administration might look like, and how the next
round of WTO negotiations should deal with TRQs
in agriculture. The authors of the following six
papers begin to provide this essential information.
In the opening paper, Boughner, de Gorter, and
Sheldon summarize the economics of TRQs and
the implications of alternative trade liberalization
scenarios, This analysis shows that to maximize
the impact of trade liberalization, it is critical for
trade negotiators to identify whether it is the out-
of-quota tariff, the in-quota tariff, or the quota that
is actually effective and to change the relevant in-
strument to maintain a trade liberalizing effect.
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Table 1. Principal Methods of
Administrating TRQs
1995 1996 1997
No, of No. of No. of
Method of Administration TRQs TRQs TRQs
Applied Tariffs 650 650 643
License on Demand 325 333 342
First-come first-served 102 104 102
Historical Importers 49 60 67
Auction 32 30 32
State Trading 22 22 20
Producer Groups 8 8 8
Mixed Allocation 42 43 42
Other 22 21 15
Not Specified 9 7 99
Sum of Above 1261 1278 1370
Total No. of TRQs in Schedules 1370 1370 1370
1995 1996 1997
No, of No. of No. of
Additional Conditions TRQs TRQs TRQs
Domestic Purchase Requirementa 46 46 46
Limits on TRQ Sharesh 102 111 118
Export CertificatesC 25 25 25
Past Trading Performanced 71 71 70
Past Trading Performance and
Limits on TRQ Shares 3 3 3
“Acondition requiring the purchase of domestic production of
the product in order to be eligible.
‘Limits the maximum share or quantity of the quota allowed.
“Requires an export cetlificate administered by the exporting
country.
‘Limits eligibility to established importers of the product con-
cerned.
Source: World Trade Organization, 1998. “Tariff Quota Ad-
ministration Methods andTariff Quota f+]].”BackgroundPaper
by the Secretariat, 6 November (AIELS4).
Boughner, de Gorter, and Sheldon also provide a
framework for understanding the implications of
allocating non-tradable, country-specific export
quotas and licenses to importing or exporting
firms. The method of allocating quotas can also
have important implications for the impact of trade
liberalization. For example, if export licenses are
allocated to high cost producers, reduction of in-
quota tariffs may result in increased quota fill,
whereas an increase in the quota may result in
quota under-fill.
The remaining five papers are case studies, in
which the authors examine specific issues in the
European Union (Bureau and Tangermann), the
United States (Skully), Japan and Korea (Choi and
Sumner), Canada (Barichello), and in developing
countries (Abbott and Morse). Four major issues
addressed in each of these country cases include:
l Identification of the many different TRQ al-





with those methods, including the additional
conditions.
The incidence and problems associated with
discrimination, as in country-specific export
quotas and import and export licensing to trad-
ing firms
The economics offill rates and the reasons for
and implications of quota under- or overfill
Problems associated with TRQ transparency
and the means by which countries may cir-
cumvent market access commitments
The URAA does not insist on each quota being
filled. In fact, a low quota fill rate does not neces-
sarily imply inefficiency, for example, there may
either be unavailable supply or insufficient de-
mand, or the in-quota tariff may be effective nor
does a fill rate of 100% or more imply efficiency,
Filled quotas may have occurred even if suppliers
are high cost importing firms or export countries/
firms, or state trading enterprises may have ful-
filled WTO commitments but have imported low
quality product or destroyed imports (see the dis-
cussion in Choi and Sumner). Either way, ineffi-
ciencies in the administration of quotas can be as-
sociated with 100% fill rates.
Fill rates for each method of administration are
given in table 2 for a subset of the total quotas for
agriculture listed in the WTO, and the number of
countries, commodity groups, and observations are
also provided for each method. The last column of
table 2 gives the distributions of fill rates falling
below 95%. The average fill rates can be mislead-
ing because some are equaJ to zero and others are
equal to 100%. They are also not weighted by trade
volume or value. Coming to conclusions using ag-
gregate data may be misleading. Hence, the case
study approach is adopted for the major countries
employing TRQs, with each of the following pa-
pers focusing on the potential problems and the
pros and cons of each administration method,
Bureau and Tangermann examine the use of
TRQs in the European Union (EU). They note that
to meet their market access obligations under the
URAA, the EU had to implement 87 TRQs, of
which 60% relate to minimum access, while the
remainder relate to current access, where this cat-
egorization provides a good deal more transpar-
ency compared with other countries such as the
U.S. Bureau and Tangermann conclude that the EU
has chosen to administer its TRQs in a way that
neither discourages imports nor improves eco-
nomic efficiency, the most common methods of
TRQ administration being licenses on demand, his-56 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2. Fill Rate Breakdown 1996
Distribution
Administration method Countries Product Groups’ Total Observations Average FI1lRate of FN Rates
<9570
no. no. no. % %
Applied Tariffs 10 12 154 72 39
Auctioning 4 4 27 38 70
First-come first-served 6 9 81 63 56
Historical Allocation 10 10 67 82 45
License on Demand 12 12 242 52 72
Mixed Allocation 7 8 42 82 55
Not Specified 2 2 6 34 83
Other 3 3 8 54 50
Producer Groups 2 6 7 53 57
State Trading 5 7 21 82 24
Total 22 12 655 63 57
‘Product groups are: cereals; oilseeds; sugar; dairy; meat, eggs; beverages;fruit and vegetables;tobacco; agriculturalfibers; coffee;
tea, spices and processed agricultural products from multiple groups; and other.
Source: ABARE (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) 1999.“WTO Agricultural Negotiations: Important
Market Access Issues” Research Report 99.3, Canberra, Australia, and World Trade Organization, 1997.“Tariff Quota Admin-
istration Methods and Tariff Quota FN.” Background Paper by the Secretariat, 6 November (AIE/S4).
torical allocation, and first-come first-served. Fill
rates have been quite high for most TRQs, and
there is no evidence that the EU has managed
TRQs in a way that discourages market access. In
fact, the TRQ system accounts for most of the
increased access to the EU after the URAA. In
terms of further trade liberalization, the authors
believe that increasing quota volumes is likely to
result in more gains than reductions in tariffs.
In the case of the United States, the WTO has
been notified of a total of 54 TRQs covering seven
product categories. Of these, the TRQs covering
sugar, peanuts, cotton, and dairy products originat-
ed in quotas designed to maintain a U.S. domestic
price support program, Skully presents an interpre-
tation of GATT Article XIII showing that it is in-
herently contradictory—it advocates non-dis-
crimination and use of tariffs, yet also permits
TRQs to be allocated on an historical basis, a pro-
cedure that is typically discriminatory, thereby re-
sulting in trade disputes, Skully notes that TRQs in
the United States are allocated on an historical
market share basis, and, once allocated, they are
likely to become difficult to redistribute in accor-
dance with changing comparative advantage.
Choi and Sumner note that Korea and Japan es-
tablished TRQs for all agricultural imports follow-
ing the URAA, specifically, 190 in the case of
Korea, and 19 in the case of Japan. Korea admin-
isters its TRQs through licenses on demand, first-
come first-served, auctioning, and state trading en-
terprises (STES). Japan uses both licenses and
STES. Although the U.S. and other exporting coun-
tries have targeted STES for investigation in the
next round of trade negotiations, TRQs involving
STES have the highest fill rates in Korea and Japan.
Nevertheless, Choi and Sumner conclude that
while TRQs have resulted in increased market ac-
cess to these countries, problems exist with their
transparency and administration. For example, rice
is imported by Korea on the basis of the lowest
tendered bid, resulting in low-quality rice supplied
by exporters who would not do well under free
trade.
Barichello focuses on the case of Canada, where
a total of21 TRQs are administered for agricultural
commodities, and the fill rates are typically high.
Most Canadian TRQs are allocated to private
firms, and administration imposes minimal burden
on importers. Because of its reliance on historical
importers, Canada has not aided efficient alloca-
tion of quotas. However, it has started to make
progress toward transferability of quotas on a per-
manent basis, with quotas now being tradable in
many categories. Overall, Barichello notes that
Canada’s TRQ regime has been successful in
maintaining transparency and minimizing costs to
importers, although additional gains could be made
through further simplification of quota administra-
tion, notably for poultry, and by making it possible
to buy and sell or rent quotas within a particular
year in all product categories. Quota rents could
also be spread more widely if quota auctions were
adopted.
Fhtally, Abbott and Morse analyze the imple-
mentation and administration of TRQs in develop-de Gorter and Sheldon
ing countries. They report that fourteen developing
countries have notified the WTO that they utilize
TRQs for over 180 agricultural commodities for
trade involving Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Gua-
temala, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Panama, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia,
and Venezuela. Abbott and Morse conclude that
only Korea and the Philippines are actually imple-
menting TRQs in the manner originally envi-
sioned. The remaining countries made TRQ noti-
fications to the WTO to verify that they are meet-
ing their access commitments. In at least half of the
total cases, an applied tariff is the relevant regime,
while for a third of the cases either licenses are
being employed or there is STE involvement. In
many cases, applied tariffs are well below a coun-
try’s bound GATT rates, the exceptions being Ko-
rea and the Philippines, where applied tariffs are
close to GATT bindings. This suggests that there
has already been substantial trade liberalization in
some of these markets and that overfill of quotas is
as common as under-fill. Abbott and Morse argue
that maximal benefits from future trade liberaliza-
tion in developing countries are most likely to
come from tariff reduction than from expansion of
quotas.
Overall, the following papers indicate that the
TRQ system is working rather well in terms of
fulfilling market access commitments, quota fill
rates, and transparency. Much more can be done,
however, to liberalize market access. At a mini-
mum, future trade negotiations within the WTO






Avoid un-weighted percent tariff reduction re-
quirements that give governments the flexibil-
ity to reduce low tariff items more and so
minimize trade liberalization
Revise baseline tariffs, because of their over-
statement, and revise baseline quotas, because
of potential understatement
Implement optimal rules to liberalize trade in
terms of how to reduce tariffs and increase
quotas
Develop rules for the administration of quota
license;, e.g., increase tradability between
firms, eliminate country specific quotas, mini-
mize unnecessary costs to the importer/
exporter,
In conclusion, TRQs have become an important
instrument affecting international agricultural trade
as signatories to the URAA endeavor to meet their
obligations to increase international access to their
markets. The overall purpose of this set of papers
is to increase understanding of how TRQs work,
both in principle and in practice with specific at-
tention paid to issues such as methods of quota
administration, quota fill, and appropriate means of
achieving trade liberalization in the presence of
TRQs. It is hoped that this special volume of the
Journal will serve as an important input for discus-
sions in the pending WTO negotiations on agricul-
ture.